Released: 24 January 1992

R J Goldstone (Chairman of the Commission)

Ref: C1034

An outline of the Commission's initial workload; its broad mandate; the setting up of various investigative Committees.

The Commission held its first meeting on 28 and 29 October 1991. It discussed its terms of reference and considered the manner in which it should approach the broad mandate given to it. The following broad guidelines were decided on:

(a) To emphasise its independence and in particular its independence from the Government and any political party.

(b) That a primary function of the Commission was to direct and co-ordinate the gathering of facts relating to public violence and intimidation in the Republic.

(c) That the Commission would not investigate past violence and intimidation save in so far as it might be directly relevant to the prevention of future violence and intimidation.

(d) That the work of the Commission, save in special circumstances, would be conducted in public.

Over 500 written requests for information concerning public violence and intimidation were sent by the Commission to all organisations which might have information relating thereto. These included all political parties, universities, newspaper editors, local authorities and civic associations. In response the Commission received relevant and useful information.

On 29 October 1991, the Commission established a committee of inquiry into the violence and alleged intimidation in Thokoza, on the East Rand, since 8 September 1991. The allegations appeared to the Commission to reflect aspects of violence which had been reported from various parts of South Africa in preceding months.

In the middle of November 1991 the Commission established a second Committee to inquire into the violence and murders which took place at the President Steyn Gold Mine in Welkom on 3 November 1991 and which were associated with the national stay-away called for by a number of organisations on 4 and 5 November 1991. The terms of reference of this Committee include the relevance to the violence of the hostel system and of the national stay-away.

During December 1991 a third Committee was established by the Commission to inquire into the procedures relating to the organisation of mass demonstrations, the conduct thereof and the role and duties of the police and other security forces.

A fourth Committee of the Commission was established during January 1992 to inquire into violence in relation to public transport in South Africa. The need for such an inquiry arose because of the high incidence of violence, including a number of deaths, on trains in certain urban areas and what has been referred to as "taxi wars".

The Commission has no doubt that its very existence is serving an important purpose. The fact that there is an independent body which can receive and ask for information in an area which has hitherto been one of secrecy in which rumours have abounded is itself encouraging. The fact that the Commission operates in public stimulates debate on these topics and that is also to the benefit of the public, the Government and political parties and organisations.

Recommendation:

The Commission is of the view that prompt establishment of and action by its committees may result in the decrease of violence. However, the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, 1991, requires committees to have at least three members, one of whom must be one of the five members of the Commission. All the members of the Commission are at present serving on committees and consequently the Commission at this stage is unable to inquire into several situations of violence which require its urgent attention. The Commission recommends that the Act be amended as soon as possible by removing the requirements that a minimum of three persons be appointed to committees and that a member of the Commission should serve on every committee.

Released: 19 February 1992

Committee: R J Goldstone (Chairman); Adv D J Rossouw SC; Prof D van Zyl Smit

Ref: C1001

Mooi River is situated some 70 km north-west of Pietermaritzburg. It is a small town serving a farming community. On the south-western side of the town is Bruntville, a Black township that was established in 1938. At present there are between 10 000 and 14 000 persons living in the township. Many of the former inhabitants have left in consequence of the violence in the area. A number of the houses in the vicinity of the hostel have been burnt and are now deserted. Bruntville is administered by the Natal Provincial Administration. It falls outside the area of administration of the KwaZulu Government. A hostel for the accommodation of men living alone was established at Bruntville in about 1959. Over 1 000 men occupy the hostel. The only employer of any consequence in the Mooi River area is Avtex Holdings Limited, trading as Mooi River Textiles. It is a company in the Anglo-Vaal Group. It employs approximately 1 200 workers, some 750 of whom live in the hostel. The other approximately 450 workers live outside the hostel in the township.

Prior to November 1990 it would appear that there was generally peace and tranquillity at Mooi River and Bruntville. Since then the inhabitants of Bruntville have become highly politicised. There are broadly two groups - Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporters and African National Congress (ANC) supporters. The hostel is, to all intents and purposes, controlled by IFP supporters and the remainder of Bruntville by ANC supporters. Workers at Mooi River Textiles who support the IFP are members of UWUSA, the trade union established by the IFP, and those who support the ANC are members of SACTWU, the trade union affiliated to COSATU.

In the submission to the Commission from the Legal Resources Centre on behalf of the Bruntville Peace Committee (which, broadly speaking, identifies with the ANC) dated 30 October 1991, it was alleged that from November 1990 to October 1991 there were at least 60 separate attacks or incidents of intimidation by the hostel dwellers upon the township residents. Reference was made to only four attacks by the residents on the hostel. On the other hand, the representatives of the KwaZulu Government, who were present at the inquiry, handed in a list of 59 alleged violent incidents by ANC supporters against IFP supporters.

It appears to be undisputed that IFP-supporters launched two attacks on dwellers in Bruntville township - the first at about 18h00 on 3 December 1991 and the second at about 04h30 the following morning. The first attack left four persons dead and the second some 15 dead. It is also not disputed that an IFP supporter, Nbuyiselwa Jophannes Mbata, died from a gunshot wound sustained by him on 3 December 1991. According to the IFP witnesses he was shot in the vicinity of the hostel. It was submitted on behalf of the Bruntville Peace Committee that he might have been shot elsewhere and thereafter moved to outside the hostel where he died. However, nothing material turns on this issue. Some few hundred men participated in the first attack by IFP supporters. They were armed with assegais, sticks and knobkerries. Many more men participated in the second attack. Estimates of witnesses varied from 400 to 1 000. They were similarly armed.

After the second attack the Police arrested 172 IFP supporters and confiscated their weapons. They comprised the following: 19 Zulu shields, 2 pangas, 1 home-made firearm, 16 bush knives, 75 knobkerries, 69 sticks, 144 spears.

According to an ANC witness, a short time prior to the second attack he saw certain IFP leaders from outside Mooi River/Bruntville arrive at the hostel. They were followed by a bus-like vehicle that was towed by a mechanical horse. The suggestion made on the strength of that evidence is that IFP supporters were brought in from outside to participate in the attack on the township. The presence of the bus was denied by the hostel dwellers. The police witnesses did not see such a vehicle in Bruntville.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It was indicated to the Committee that if lasting solutions and peace do not come to Mooi River, the only large employer, Mooi River Textiles, may well have to move its factory to another area. This would be disastrous for the people of Mooi River. Self-interest should dictate to the local leadership that they must work together to create a more Peaceful and acceptable climate Government agencies at all levels can only provide a framework and an infrastructure for this. At the end of the day it is the people themselves, through their leaders, who will determine the success or failure of any initiatives taken in order to achieve a successful result.

Support from all appropriate quarters for the Local Dispute Resolution Committee and the disarming of the people of Bruntville are essential prerequisites for lasting peace in the area.

It was submitted on behalf of the Bruntville Peace Committee that the Commission should recommend that the conduct of certain members of the Police Force at Mooi River be referred to the Attorney-General. However, evidence led before the Committee did not, in the opinion of the Commission, establish any prima facie unlawful conduct on the part of any police officer save in regard to the improper use of a forfeited vehicle with false number plates. The Commission recommends that appropriate steps be taken to prevent the recurrence of such conduct and that the South African Police consider disciplinary action against the police officers who were involved.

The Commission recommends further that the South African Police make every endeavour to bring the perpetrators of the violence committed at Mooi River to justice and that the Attorney-General be requested to render assistance in that regard.

| INTRODUCTION | BACKGROUND FACTS REGARDING MOOI RIVER | VIOLENCE AT MOOI RIVER | THE EVENTS OF 3 AND 4 DECEMBER 1991 | THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE SECURITY FORCES | AN END TO THE VIOLENCE AT BRUNTVILLE |

Released: 19 February 1992

Ref: C1003

The submission made to the Committee was that if IFP supporters had been brought into Bruntville some of them would have been among the 172 arrested by the Police. The representatives of both IFP and the Bruntville Peace Committee supported an investigation concerning the places of work and residence of the arrested men.

The investigation was conducted as follows: (a) As first step the names of those arrested were compared with a list of hostel dwellers supplied by the Bruntville administration and also with a list of employees furnished by Mooi River Textiles. Although it was ascertained that about 70 of those arrested resided in the hostel and worked at Mooi River, this method proved unsatisfactory and inconclusive. (b) Four advocates of the Natal Bar were subsequently commission by the committee to trace approximately 100 of the 172 arrested men about whom there remained doubt whether they resided at the hostel and worked at Mooi River. The four advocates spent 6 and 7 February in the field, but the difficult and extensive terrain defeated the venture. (c) On 14 February two members of the committee, Adv D J Rossouw and Prof D van Zyl Smit, and two members of the Commission staff, Adv J J du Toit and Lt Col Heslinga, traveled to Mooi River where the 172 men appeared in court again for remand. After the court appearance 94 of the 100 men referred to above were questioned by the committee and staff members.

This investigation proved that, with one or two exceptions, all of the 172 persons arrested were hostel dwellers and that the vast majority were employed by Mooi River Textiles. It must therefore be concluded that IFP supporters were not transported into Bruntville from elsewhere to participate in the fighting on 4 December 1991.

The committee also used the opportunity occasioned by its visit to Mooi River on 14 February 1992 to enquire into the progress of the peace process in Mooi River and Bruntville. It was disappointed to find that the peace process had not gone as smoothly as planned. There appear to have been a series of misunderstandings between the parties which had led to meetings not being attended. Discussions with both local ANC and Inkatha leaders suggested that the misunderstandings could be removed and that it remains possible that a local dispute resolution committee will be established. The committee stressed that patience and tolerance were needed in the peace process, that direct communication with the other party was preferable to relying on rumour or press reports and that such communications should be relayed for the information of all residents.

In the discussions with the local leaders it became apparent that the carrying of weapons was continuing and that it was contributing to tensions both in Bruntville and in Mooi River. Thus, on one occasion, Inkatha supporters had been denied access by the ANC to the community hall where they were to have been addressed by the Chairman of the Regional Peace Committee for Natal. The reason given by the ANC was that the Inkatha supporters had arrived armed with spears and that the ANC had feared for the safety of its own supporters and for that of children in a neighbouring school. The IFP in turn alleged that its supporters had to be armed in order to protect themselves from the concealed weapons carried by members of the ANC.

Released: 28 February 1992

Committee: Mr G Steyn (Chairman); Adv D A Bregman; Mr R M M Zondo

Ref: C1025

The violence and murders which took place at the President Steyn Gold Mine in Welkom on 3 November 1991 and which were associated with the national stay-away called for by a number of organisations on 4 and 5 November 1991.

TERMS OF REFERENCE:

The terms of reference of the inquiry drafted in consultation with the National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), Free State Consolidated Gold Mining (Operation) Limited (Freegold), and the South African Police (SAP) were:

3.1 To inquire into the cause or causes of the violence which erupted at the President Steyn Gold Mine, Welkom, on and after 3 November 1991.

3.2 Without derogating from the generality of paragraph 3.1, to inquire in particular into -

3.2.1 the relevance to the violence of the hostel system;

3.2.2 the relevance to the violence of the national stay-away called by COSATU, NACTU and other organisations on 4 and 5 November 1991;

3.2.3 the reason or reasons for the continuance and escalation of the violence after 3 November 1991;

3.2.4 the identification and determination of the influence, if any, of political and other organizations, both South African and foreign, relevant to the violence;

3.2.5 the relevance to the violence of the reaction of Freegold to the stay-way and its communications thereof to its employees and of the reaction thereto of NUM and its communication with its members employed at the mine.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) That NUM and management negotiate in an effort to reach agreement as to the legitimacy of democratic political activity in the hostel. Such agreement ought to have regard both to the reasonable needs of the worker and to the reasonable needs of management, bearing in mind the prerogatives and responsibilities of management.

(b) That the control of meetings be a matter for negotiation between management and NUM, with accountability and responsibility lines clearly laid down.

(c) That in respect of disciplinary hearings suitably qualified and trained persons conduct them and that management review existing training to ensure that an appropriate quality and standard of decisions and disciplinary hearings be achieved.

(d) That consideration be given by the mining industry to the appointment of a suitable ombudsman acceptable to management and NUM to deal promptly with complaints and facilitate agreements between NUM and management or issues between them.

(e) That the present negotiations between NUM and management to alleviate pressures and tensions in the hostel be finalised as a matter of urgency. (f) That the present negotiations between NUM and management for an agreed code of conduct relating to stay-aways be complete as a matter of urgency.

| MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE | APPOINTMENT OF THE COMMITTEE | TERMS OF REFERENCE | COMMITTEE SESSIONS | REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES | PARTICULARS OF THE MINE | THE NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS | THE VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT) STAY-AWAY | EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE VIOLENCE | CHRONOLOGY OF THE EVENTS | FINDINGS | THE HOSTEL SYSTEM | THE NATIONAL STAY-AWAY CALLED BY COSATU, NACTU AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS | THE CONTINUANCE AND ESCALATION OF THE VIOLENCE AFTER 3 NOVEMBER 1991 | THE INFLUENCE, IF ANY, OF POLITICAL AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, BOTH SOUTH AFRICAN AND FOREIGN, RELEVANT TO THE VIOLENCE | THE REACTION OF FREEGOLD TO THE STAY-AWAY | INVOLVEMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE | INVOLVEMENT OF MINE SECURITY | RECOMMENDATIONS | CONCLUSION |

Released: 29 April 1992

R J Goldstone (Chairman of the Commission)

Ref: C1035

With regard to specific incidents of violence the Commission's approach has been to inquire into paradigm situations where, on the face of it, the symptoms are common to other areas of violence. The Commission has at all times been convinced, and remains so, that factual findings cannot be made against individuals, groups or organizations on the basis of untested evidence. For this reason the hearings of the Commission and of committees of the Commission have been held in public and witnesses have been subjected to cross-examination by lawyers representing interested parties. This procedure, by its nature, is cumbersome and time consuming.

From the inception of its deliberations, the Commission has held the view that one of its most important functions is to act as a catalyst in the process of transforming the Police Force into a body that has the confidence, respect and co-operation of the vast majority of the people of South Africa. The committee established to inquire into the policing of mass demonstrations was conceived as the point of entry - the first of a number of inquiries that would investigate and make recommendations on important issues relating to policing in general. If the Commission continues to be immersed in an increasing number of inquiries into incidents of violence this important function will inevitably be delayed.

Then there is the issue concerning the safety of witnesses who testify before the Commission. The murder of the leader of the "Black Cats" in Wesselton and the apparent revenge murder of the mother of a renegade "Black Cat" witness in the same township highlight this problem. These murders took place during the course of the investigation into the "Black Cats" and are therefore likely to severely diminish the willingness of members of the public to come forward and testify.

In the above circumstances, a reconsideration of the role and functions of the Commission has become urgent and inevitable. In particular, the Commission has been forced by circumstances to report now on conclusions reached by it at this stage. It would have preferred not to do so at what is clearly a premature juncture in its work. However, the alternative would be to continue inquiring with judicial detachment when urgent steps are required to contain the violence.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Commission recommends at this stage that the following steps can and should be taken immediately:

The deployment of an effective police presence in local communities who are able to work in close co-operation with local dispute resolution committees established in terms of the Peace Accord. If they are perceived by the local communities as working with their own representatives there is some prospect that they will be perceived as a friendly force and will begin to gain communal confidence and support.

The new Division of Internal Stability would appear to be the only suitable branch of the South African Police for such work. This branch should also work in co-operation with justices of the peace as soon as that office has been created in terms of the Peace Accord.

The investigative functions of the Commission will continue to play an important role in relation to the curbing of ongoing violence. In this regard the Commission should as soon as possible be granted adequate means and procedures for offering protection to witnesses who testify before it or its committees.

The widely held view by a large number of people in KwaZulu and neighbouring areas that the KwaZulu Police are a private army of the Inkatha Freedom Party is a matter of great concern in relation to the curbing of violence in those areas. No less disturbing is the evidence that has been given concerning unlawful activities by senior members of the KwaZulu Police. As some of these allegations are at present under investigation by a committee of the Commission, it would not be proper to comment further on this matter at the present time. Criminal charges are at present being investigated by the Commissioner of the KwaZulu Police in consequence of evidence placed before the committee about the false identity given to a member of that police force.

Recent activities by members of Umkontho we Sizwe are a matter for concern. It is significant in this regard that a Transvaal leader of that organization admitted to a committee of the Commission that it was unable to control all its members.

Organizations whose members are responsible for violence have a heavy responsibility to control and impose discipline upon their members. This applies no less to the South African Defence Force and Police than to the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party. All of those organizations should establish committees to be responsible for immediately investigating and reporting to the Peace Committee and the Commission on allegations of Public violence.

Hostels are common to most of the worst areas of violence. All hostels should immediately be adequately and securely fenced. A strong and efficient police presence should ensure that no arms are taken in or out of hostels. It should also be in a position to protect all hostel dwellers from external attack.

The Commission is convinced that the carrying of any dangerous weapons in public should be outlawed - whether in respect of political meetings or at any other place. In Natal, it is predominantly members of the Inkatha Freedom Party who insist on this unacceptable practice. Other Zulu men do not find it necessary to do so, either for cultural or any other reasons. The Commission finds it quite unacceptable that even the limited ban on the carrying of weapons to political meetings has been ignored by the Inkatha Freedom Party on at least one occasion during a march through the streets of Johannesburg. This public flaunting of the law in the presence of a large South African Police presence is unfortunate and should not be allowed to occur again in the future. Steps should be taken urgently to prohibit the carrying in public of any dangerous weapons at any time at all. This constitutes provocative and unacceptable behaviour in any decent society. It is calculated, furthermore, to create a climate of violence.

The Commission can assure you that all information received by it has already been publicly investigated or is the subject of current public inquiry. In the result, no information has been received by the Commission that could enable it to make any findings relating to a systematic or nationally organized campaign of violence. It is a cause for comment that, notwithstanding the absence of evidence, political leaders, especially in the African National Congress and Inkatha Freedom Party, have frequently made wide-ranging allegations placing the blame for violence on other political parties and on the State security forces. The violence is an ongoing phenomenon. If and when evidence is placed before the Commission it will be thoroughly and publicly investigated. Unless and until that is done the Commission can only deprecate allegations that are calculated to exacerbate the climate of violence.

| INTRODUCTION | THE CAUSES OF VIOLENCE | STEPS TO CURB VIOLENCE |

Released: 10 June 1992

Committee: M N S Sithole (Chairman); L G S Baqwa; R S K Tucker

Ref: C1004

On the evening of 8 April 1992 shooting was heard from Phola Park.(Phola Park: the shack settlement of Phola Park was established at the southern end of Tokoza township, near Alberton, immediately adjacent to the Old Vereeniging Road. In a very limited area such as Phola Park there are approximately 4 000 to 5 000 very small shacks. There are very narrow access ways (which cannot be described as streets and which do not provide free vehicular access). There are no open spaces and an average of five to six people live in each shack.) A platoon of 32 Battalion of the South African Defence Force investigated the shooting and on arrival came under fire. One member of 32 Battalion was wounded by a bullet fired from Phola Park as he disembarked from a Casspir. Two further platoons were then ordered to go to the assistance of the first platoon. The committee is satisfied on the evidence which it heard that at least some members of the Phola Park self-defence unit were involved in a gun battle with 32 Battalion, and that AK 47s were used in that battle. During the battle a substantial number of shots were fired by both sides and more than 200 rounds were fired by members of 32 Battalion. A number of bullets penetrated the shacks of Phola Park residents, and at least two residents were injured in their shacks by bullets and subsequently died. In both instances there were bullet holes in the shacks in which the two people in question were fatally injured.

When the gun battle stopped the captain (who was located at the Steunpunt) gave an order to Lieutenant Ras, who was in command of the three platoons at Phola Park, to conduct a sweep of a section of Phola Park. Evidence was given that the reason for giving the command was to look for people who might have been injured or killed because they had been caught in the cross-fire of the gun battle and to look for firearms. It was acknowledged that a secondary purpose of the sweep was to pick up any people who had actually been involved in the gun battle. Evidence was led that in conducting the sweep all the soldiers were disciplined, under reasonably direct control and that they looked at shacks for signs of bullet holes and that if there were bullet holes they made a point of ensuring that no-one in the shack was injured. In at least one instance a person who was injured or killed by a bullet, and where there was a bullet hole in the side of the shack, was not found until four days later. In another instance there is evidence that a soldier or soldiers actually entered a shack and nevertheless left an injured person lying in the shack who died the following morning. In either event the reason that was given for entering Phola Park in the first place was not communicated to the soldiers or alternatively was communicated to the soldiers and was then carried out in a totally ineffectual manner by the soldiers.

In the process of conducting the sweep, a number of members of 32 Battalion entered shacks of the residents of Phola Park and, as acknowledged by the legal representatives of 32 Battalion on behalf of 32 Battalion, committed unspecified "acts of violence" against "a resident or residents" of Phola Park. Generic evidence of the circumstances under which these acts of violence were committed was led by the legal representatives of 32 Battalion as suggested justification therefor. The committee cannot however find any grounds of justification for acts of violence having been committed against innocent residents of Phola Park. These acts of violence constituted unlawful acts of assault. It was not in the committee's mandate nor was evidence led on which the committee could come to any specific findings of rape, murder or other specified assault. The committee recommends however that as a matter of the utmost urgency the alleged acts of assault, rape and murder should be investigated and where appropriate the offenders brought to trial.

The committee heard evidence from the captain in command of 32 Battalion on the night in question. He justified the use of what would normally be regarded as excessive force by soldiers on the grounds that they were involved in what amounted to a war. His evidence caused the committee considerable concern, and raises the distinction between soldiers fighting a war as opposed to a peacekeeping force maintaining law an order. The committee can envisage circumstances in which a war is being fought and in which, as a follow-up to a gun battle, soldiers might be excused for using what would normally be regarded as excessive force not only against the soldiers against whom they were fighting but also against the civilians of the opposing nation. There is however a vast distinction between those circumstances and the circumstances on the night of 8 April when members of 32 Battalion found themselves in what amounted to a gun battle with a group of individuals, but in which their responsibility as a peace-keeping force for the maintenance of law and order in relation to the civilian population of Phola Park was in no way affected. Under those circumstances the use of excessive force cannot be justified and the committee is most concerned that the attitude of the captain in question might prevail elsewhere in the Defence Force. This being the case the committee recommends as a matter of the utmost urgency that all Defence Force units involved in the maintenance of law and order should have this critical distinction drawn for them, and should be trained concerning the role of a peace-keeping force and its responsibility towards the population for whose benefit it is maintaining law and order.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) That the South African Police and the Attorney-General of the Witwatersrand urgently complete investigations into acts of violence, including murder and rape, allegedly committed by members of 32 Battalion against residents of Phola Park and that, where appropriate, the offenders be brought to trial;

(b) that 32 Battalion should not again be used for peace-keeping duties anywhere in South Africa; and

(c) that the Defence Force give urgent consideration to any steps that may be necessary to ensure that especially senior officers are made aware of their special role in peace-keeping duties and that the attitude of the captain referred to in the committee's report is not one generally found in the officer corps.

Released: 10 June 1992

Committee: D J Rossouw (Chairman); L S van Zyl

Ref: C1098

The causes of violence in the taxi industry in the Western Cape.

The roots of the taxi war in the Western Cape go back many years. Permits to conduct taxi businesses were granted to Blacks who qualified for residence rights in terms of section 10 of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, 1945 (since repealed). These permits limited the scope of business to the Black townships, as the name of the first Black taxi association, LAGUNYA (for Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga) indicates. An informal taxi sector developed among relative newcomers to the area who did not qualify for residence rights and consequently were also unable to obtain taxi permits. These "pirates" plied their trade outside the townships, i.e. to and from the city centre. These "pirates" (who later formed WEBTA [Western Cape Black Taxi Association]) were tolerated by LAGUNYA while they were "unlawful" and they were being arrested, prosecuted and fined; their vehicles were impounded and often declared forfeit.

The trickle of newcomers to the city over the years swelled to a flood in the 1980s, and especially after influx control was abolished in 1986. The Local Road Transportation Board (LRTB) relaxed its strict requirements for permits (the process referred to as deregulation) and many WEBTA members obtained permits and were allowed to continue to service routes from the townships to the city. LAGUNYA perceived this development as a double-cross by the LRTB and the legalising of WEBTA as a threat. LAGUNYA's feeling of grievance and its perception of having "earned" its right to a permit through having qualified on residence, and WEBTA's perception that it had "earned" its right to a permit through years of persecution, set the scene for conflict.

It is a forlorn hope that one will discover who cast the first stone, and that would in all probability be irrelevant. The conflict has taken on frightening proportions and despite the intervention by various persons and bodies it has flared up again and again. The cost of the war, calculated up to the first quarter of this year, is awesome; some 66 people have been killed and damage to property runs to R3,6 million.

Released: 2 July 1992

Committee: D J Rossouw (Chairman); L S van Zyl

Ref: C1024

Violence in the taxi industry in the Midrand area.

On Thursday 11 June 1992 the Committee established to inquire into the violence occurring in the taxi industry held a preliminary inquiry regarding the causes of violence associated with taxis in the Midrand area especially in Ivory Park.

The transport of passengers residing in Ivory Park has become an issue of conflict between two existing taxi associations which erupted into violence and resulted in the death of at least two persons, one being a passenger, and injuries to two other passengers. There are suggestions that the dispute has not died down and that further violence may be experienced if the root causes are not addressed with alacrity. Ivory Park is a fairly new squatter community of some 70 000 persons. The roots of the discord are to be found in the commercial competition between taxi associations for the new market opening up there.

A circumstance that has an impact on the situation is the fact that Ivory Park does not seem to receive any official recognition in the sense that the Municipality's application to have it declared a township has not after eight months been approved. The result is that the Municipal law enforcement agencies do not enjoy official recognition in the area. The Mayor of Midrand complains that the South African Police are understaffed and ill-equipped to deal with some 200 000 people in the whole Midrand area. No armoured vehicles are available and the area is policed from Halfway House, some 20 kilometres away, when Olifantsfontein, a mere 2 kilometres away, would be the natural command post.

Without examining the details of the violence (which is in any event the subject of urgent Police inquiry, we are assured) the most obvious steps that can be taken to alleviate the position are the official recognition of Ivory Park as a township and the accompanying upgrading of the Police presence and facilities in the area.

As in other parts of the country, the complaint emerged that the permit system as administered by the Local Road Transportation Board (LRTB) was ineffective and was a contributory cause of tension. This may be due to two actors: first, that two LRTB's had jurisdiction in the area and, secondly, that the type of permit that was issued, i.e. the "radius" permit, led to misunderstandings and tension. In the Interim Report tabled in Parliament on 19 June it was indicated that the existing permit system would require to be revised. In this instance the representatives from Midrand refer to the LRTB as a "remote issuing body, unrelated to local conditions". On the other hand, the Chief Traffic Officer of Midrand testified that there was good co-operation between his office and the LRTB.

The Committee attempted to involve SABTA (South African Black Taxi Association), the national body, but to no avail. All the taxi associations are affiliated, directly or indirectly, to SABTA and it seems to the Committee that SABTA has an important role to play in mediating in a dispute of this nature.

The Council of the Municipality of Midrand, within whose area Ivory Park lies, has, with the support of all the taxi associations established the Midrand Taxi Forum in an attempt to facilitate conflict resolution. It is still too early to determine whether the Forum will play a valuable role and whether its decisions will have a lasting effect. According to the Mayor and a representative of the Municipality, a cease-fire is in operation, but the warring parties are not really at peace with each other. Evidence given on behalf of the feuding taxi associations also tends to indicate that the hatchet has not been buried, although a peace agreement between them was signed under the aegis of the Local Dispute Resolution Committee. The Committee urges the parties to use these bodies as facilitators of negotiations. As events in Cape Town and Springs have shown, the way to peace lies in the hands of taxi drivers themselves. Solutions imposed on the industry by outsiders do not work.

In the Committee's view many of the features which have a negative impact on the taxi industry elsewhere in the country are also present in the Ivory Park situation, in some cases with less intensity.

Released: 6 July 1992

Committee: Mr G Steyn (Chairman); Mr S Moshidi; Mr B M Ngoepe

Ref: C1031

Report on violence committed on trains in the Southern Transvaal. The commuter railway lines in the Southern Transvaal are divided into three sections, namely, the Johannesburg section, the Soweto section and the Germiston section. The inquiry was confined to these sections.

The number of people who lost their lives during 1 July 1991 to 27 April 1992 totaled 138. Deaths and injuries have always occurred on the rail commuter system. In the past they were caused by both unlawful acts and accidents of a general nature. The evidence is, however, that the violence gradually assumed a political character. Violence is at present often committed by groups of attackers who kill or injure commuters indiscriminately.

There are approximately 27 hostels in this area. Most of them are adjacent to the rail system. They are in the vicinity of townships and, in some areas, next to emerging squatter camps. It is common cause that violence has been raging in the townships for some time. This violence is the result of ongoing conflict between, amongst others, hostel dwellers and township residents. In recent times the violence has spilled over on to the trains. People in trains are easy targets because they have, over the years, formed themselves into groups that always use the same coach on the same train. This happened for various reasons, such as self-protection and religious, criminal and political interests. As a result, a person entering a wrong coach might find himself a victim.

It is common cause that ordinary criminals take advantage of political instability. This occurs on trains as well. It is not always easy to distinguish ordinary criminal activity from political violence. This is especially so where offenders are not apprehended, which is the case with the vast majority of incidents.

Owing to interference by commuters, many coach doors do not close. It is therefore easy to be thrown out or to fall through those doors. This also makes it difficult to establish the true cause of the death or injury. This problem is exacerbated by the reluctance of witnesses to come forward.

The duty of the South African Transport Services (SATS) to provide public transport in South Africa was, with the exception of rail commuter services, transferred to Spoornet Limited by the Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services Act, 1989 (Act 9 of 1989). Section 22 of the Act transferred the rail commuter services component to a legal person, the South African Rail Commuter Corporation Limited (SARCC). This took place on 1 April 1990. Most assets of the rail commuter services were, at the same time, transferred to the SARCC.

The State is the sole shareholder in the SARCC. The SARCC is managed by a Board of Control, whose members are appointed by the Minister.

The SARCC does not itself operate the rail commuter service. This service is operated by Transnet Limited, the legal successor to SATS. For this purpose the SARCC, entered into a business agreement supplemented by a management agreement with Transnet Limited to operate such commuter services and to maintain its assets.

According to evidence before the Committee, the assets received by the SARCC were, in general, in a state of disrepair. At many stations fences, shelters, waiting rooms, toilets and benches had been vandalised.

As a result of the incorporation of the former South African Railway Police (SARP) into the SAP in 1986, police functions on railway premises were scaled down drastically. This resulted in a negative perception of unsafeness and a decrease in commuters. At the same time evasion of rail fares increased.

The Committee was informed that the State Security Council resolved on 15 October 1990 that security on the public component of the SARCC was the responsibility of the SAP and that the SARCC was responsible for the security of the non-public component. The public component of the SARCC's business consists of the stations and trains. Security in this area involves the maintenance of law and order on all stations and trains. Security with regard to the non-public component entails the protection of property and cash and ensuring the safety of staff. Spoornet Security Services provides this.

FINDINGS:

* The violence on the trains cannot be separated from the ongoing violence in the townships. The primary causes and participants appear to be the same. The Committee agrees, in this regard, with the findings set out in the Second Interim Report, dated 29 April 1992, of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation. This Committee is also unable on the evidence before it to apportion blame. Whenever a group of attackers was identified they turned out to be hostel dwellers. There were, however, other unidentified groups. Victims were members of various Black ethnic groups. No definite pattern could be established.

* A number of secondary causes also emerged. They are, without necessarily setting them out in the order of importance: -

(a) The lack of proper control over access to the stations. This makes it easy for perpetrators of violence to bring their weapons on to the trains. The fact that some stations have no access control at all makes matters worse.

(b) Overcrowded trains during peak hours. This factor renders the maintenance of law and order in coaches impossible.

(c) The absence of interleading doors between coaches. This makes it difficult for commuters to flee from an attack, causing them to jump out through doors and windows. Interleading doors do, however, pose other dangers. The whole matter deserves consideration by the SARCC.

(d) Poor control at exit points. This enables attackers to escape, even with their weapons.

(e) The lack of funds to upgrade SARCC property adequately. This makes it difficult for the SARCC to implement measures which would enhance the safety of commuters.

(f) Control points located on the platforms. Commuters habitually wait on the bridge and descend on to platforms only when the train arrives; this rush puts pressure on policing. People with weapons, and those without tickets, then easily get on to the train.

(g) The apparent uncertainty between the SARCC and the SAP about their respective roles at access points. This adversely affects proper access control.

(h) The failure to demonstrate to the community, with effective prosecutions, that justice is being done. This has resulted in the community losing confidence in the police and the administration of justice. It has also resulted in witnesses not coming forward and, consequently, a lack of information.

(i) The carrying of weapons in public. Apart from the fact that these weapons are being used to injure and kill, in the present situation they also cause panic.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

* All leaders are urged to do their utmost to curb the violence as a matter of urgency. Structures of the National Peace Accord should also be utilised.

* The Committee is aware of the ongoing investigation into the system of policing on railway premises and of the reorganisation initiated and implemented by Major-General Bester on 1 June 1992. In addition, the Committee feels that the function of guarding access control points at stations on a full-time basis is not an SAP function. This function could more practically be performed by the SARCC. Accordingly, we support the suggestion by Major-General Bester that consideration be given to the creation of a guards corps, recruited from the community and employed by the SARCC. These recruits should receive proper police training. Their duty should be to secure access to the stations. (They should not be ticket controllers.) They should be in a distinctive uniform and be under the control of the Manager of Spoornet Security Services. Every effort should be made to ensure that the community is also involved in this system.

* The Visible Policing Division as deployed on the railways is performing a function which is primarily the duty of the SAP. The reconstruction of this division for purposes of policing on the railways, as implemented from 1 June 1992 by Major-General Bester is fully supported by the Committee. The Committee has noted, with approval, Major-General Bester's remarks that the aim of this restructuring is to ensure continuity and to contribute towards the creation of commuters' confidence in the SAP.

* The Committee recommends that members of the SAP deployed on stations and trains should, as soon as possible, be appointed "authorised officers" by the SARCC for purposes of the Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act, 1985.

* The Committee recommends that existing facilities for the SAP on railway stations be improved. For example, the Committee is not convinced that the ZOZO huts provide sufficient safety and comfort. Communication systems should at all times be reliable.

* The SARCC should consider moving access and exit control points from the platforms to the outside of the stations. (At two-thirds of the stations these points are present on platforms.) Those stations without access and exit control points should receive urgent attention.

* Because the SARCC is unable to generate sufficient funds to provide the necessary safety measures, the Committee's recommendations will be rendered ineffective unless sufficient funds are made available. The Committee accordingly recommends that the Government give urgent assistance in this regard.

* The Committee mentioned in its report that whenever a group of attackers was identified, they turned out to be hostel dwellers. Hostels have for some time been a cause of concern in the violence situation. It is the view of the Committee that this aspect has to date not enjoyed the attention it deserves. The Committee is particularly perturbed about the apparent lack of control over the hostels and also the lack of clarity, as to who exercises authority over them. As this is a point of great concern, the Committee recommends that the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation urgently consider appointing a committee to look into the whole issue of hostels. Pending that, however, the Committee suggests the immediate implementation of the recommendations contained in paragraph 3.2.7 of the Second Interim Report of the Commission to the State President, dated 29 April 1992, regarding the fencing of hostels, the establishment of a police presence, the prevention of carrying of weapons by hostel dwellers and their protection.

* Brigadier James Moore, Manager of Spoornet Security Services suggested that to deal with train violence successfully a national strategy should be devised. He submitted that the authorities' response to violence is reactive. Actions by the SAP, the SARCC and Spoornet are not co-ordinated. They do not always act with the same purpose. This leads to wastage of resources. He accepted that the violence on trains spilled over from the ongoing conflict in the townships. The Committee is of the opinion that the conflict goes beyond just the train violence. We accordingly recommend that the question of a National Strategy to prevent violence can be more properly dealt with by the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation.

* The Committee recommends that the main objective and aim of the SARCC, namely, "to provide rail commuter services" should be extended to include the provision of reliable, safe and cost-effective commuter services which meet the reasonable needs and standards of the community. This would place greater emphasis on the duty to ensure the safety of commuters.

| PARTICULARS OF THE RAIL COMMUTER OPERATION | RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAIL COMMUTER CORPORATION LIMITED (SARCC) PROPERTY | FINANCIAL SITUATION OF SARCC | UPGRADING OF THE SARCC PROPERTY AND SECURITY SITUATION | THE OCCURRENCE AND NATURE OF VIOLENCE ON THE RAILWAYS IN SOUTHERN TRANSVAAL | THE INCORPORATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAILWAY POLICE INTO THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE (SAP) | THE ROLE OF THE SAP IN THE SECURITY SITUATION ON SARCC PROPERTY |

Released: 21 September 1992

R J Goldstone (Chairman of the Commission)

Ref: C1017

Not all hostels are associated with violence - criminality in a number of hostels.

Not all hostels are associated with violence. The problem should properly be seen as one of criminality in a limited number of hostels. Precisely which localities are affected is a matter that the committee will have to investigate.

The criminality that is associated with those hostels is a matter that must be addressed and dealt with by the Government, which has the primary responsibility for maintaining law and order.

In view of the advice from its committee that violence is associated with only a limited number of hostels, the Commission considers that its earlier recommendation that all hostels be fenced off is no longer appropriate. The Commission has accordingly decided to modify that recommendation so as to make it applicable, where practical, only to those hostels that have been associated with violence.

The committee has drawn to the attention of the Commission various issues that arise in relation to the future development of hostels. What is clear to the Commission is that the fullest consultation is required between all parties concerned if future conflict surrounding these issues is to be avoided.

To assist in facilitating discussion and consultation between all parties concerned, the Commission has requested the Human Sciences Research Council to undertake a project aimed at developing a proper understanding of the many sensitive issues that underlie future hostels development. That project is already in progress.

Released: 29 September 1992

Committee: R J Goldstone (Chairman of the Commission); D J Rossouw (Vice-Chairman); M N S Sithole; L Baqwa

Ref: C1010

On 7 September 1992 a large protest march on Bisho, the capital of Ciskei, was organized by an alliance of the African National Congress (ANC), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP).

The principal demand of the alliance which was to be highlighted by the march was for free political activity and an end to violence in the Ciskei. Political repression and violence in the Ciskei were associated with Brigadier  Gqozo's regime and so the call for free political activity and an end to violence was linked to a demand for his removal.

The Ciskei authorities at all times were unwilling to grant permission for any demonstration on Ciskei soil notwithstanding attempts to obtain an agreement which was initiated by the South African Government, the SAP and non-governmental organizations.

After the commencement of the march some Alliance leaders went ahead "to reconnoitre" the situation at the border. On arrival at the border they noticed that the road had been blocked by rolls of razor wire to prevent the marchers from proceeding along the road to Bisho. There was also razor wire placed strategically to channel the marchers to their left and into the Bisho Stadium on the southern side. That stadium is situated very close to the border. The leaders met with the Chairman of the National Peace Committee, Mr John Hall, the Chairman of the NPS, Dr Antonie Gildenhuys and other observers who were present in order to assist in keeping the proceedings peaceful. Mr Hall and Dr Gildenhuys informed the Alliance leaders who included Messrs Cyril Ramaphosa, Chris Hani and Ronnie Kasrils that the Ciskei authorities were determined that the Alliance supporters would not be allowed into any part of Ciskei other than the Bisho Stadium. The Alliance leaders indicated that if they were prevented from entering Bisho they would have to consider their options. They did not accept that the Ciskei security forces had any right to frustrate their plans. Representatives of the NPS offered their services as go-betweens and it was agreed that there would be discussions between them and the leaders of the march when it arrived at the razor wire barrier.

In the vicinity of the Bisho Stadium, which is close to the South African Border, members of the Ciskei Defence Force (CDF) shot at a group of the marchers. In consequence 29 people were killed and hundreds were injured. According to the CDF some 425 rounds of ammunition were fired by their members.

There is only one material dispute, viz whether shots were fired at the soldiers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Those in control of any region, city or town anywhere in South Africa, including the TBVC homelands, should tolerate and allow complete freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly.

Mass action must be organized in such a manner that all reasonable steps are taken to avoid violence. At the cost of repetition, that can only be achieved by removing, as far as possible, the risks created by unpredictable conduct.

The leaders of all organizations which use forms of mass public demonstrations should do so only as a peaceful means to popularise political policies and propagate political changes. they should immediately and publicly abandon any political action calculated to result in conflict and violence.

In order to avoid physical conflict and violence, mass demonstrations should not be used as a means of causing serious and non-temporary disturbance or as a means of direct political intimidation.

The leadership of the TBVC homelands and of the self-governing territories should forthwith publicly declare themselves willing to tolerate and facilitate reasonable and negotiated public mass demonstrations in the areas under their control.

The leadership of the Alliance should publicly censure Mr Kasrils and other persons who were responsible for the decision to lead demonstrators through the gap in the fence and thereby knowingly or negligently expose them to the danger of death and injury.

The officers commanding the CDF should immediately conduct a full enquiry into the training and discipline of their members with the intention of taking such steps as may be necessary to ensure that a recurrence of the undisciplined, unprofessional and wholly unacceptable conduct of which they were guilty on 7 September 1992 cannot recur. The results of such enquiry and the steps taken pursuant thereto should be made public.

The Attorney-General of Ciskei should investigate criminal charges against any person responsible for death or injury of any person shot in or in the vicinity of the Bisho stadium on 7 September 1992.

The Ciskei Council of State should publicly acknowledge that members of the CDF acted reprehensibly and unacceptably in reacting in a wholly disproportionate manner and causing the unnecessary deaths and injuries to people who were fleeing from them.

| The march | The shooting | Discussion concerning the allegation of shots fired by demonstrators | The policy of the Ciskei authorities | The conduct of the Ciskei security forces before the march | The conduct of the alliance organisers | The shooting by the Ciskei forces.

Released: 27 October 1992

Committee: R M Wise, SC

Ref: C1013

Investigation into the allegations published by the Weekly Mail newspaper on 8 and 15 May 1992 concerning the planning or instigation of acts of violence by members of the South African Police in the Vaal area.

The evidence presented to the full Commission at that preliminary inquiry consisted of statements made under oath by Mr Drew Forrest, a journalist in the employ of the Weekly Mail and the author of the principal articles concerned; by Mr A. Harber, the editor of the Weekly Mail; and by Col. Potgieter, the officer commanding the Crime Intelligence Service of the SAP in the Vaal area, on behalf of Lt Gen P.J. Viljoen. From this evidence and from the articles themselves it was clear that the allegations concerning the planning and instigation of violence were based, in the first instance, on statements by one Daniel Kolisang ("Kolisang") and one Solly Mngomezulu ("Mngomezulu") and, in the second instance, on inferences drawn from such statements and other facts and alleged facts, which were ascertained by Mr Forrest and others during the course of their investigations.

These articles in the Weekly Mail, in addition to containing allegations about the planning and/or instigation of acts of violence by members of the SAP, also dealt at length with other matters, viz. the facts and alleged facts referred to above. In particular there was much about the use by the South African Police of unmarked vehicles with false number plates; about the "safe" houses which were used by the police and which were not registered in the name of the SAP but in the names of other persons; of the use of page (sic) (presumably "paging") numbers and the persons or companies in whose names such numbers were registered and about the identity and details of a number of policemen most of whom were alleged to have used false names.

FINDINGS

The Committee finds that the statements by Daniel Kolisang and Solly Mngomezulu with regard to the SAP having planned and instigated violence, which constituted the basis of reports by the Weekly Mail in its editions of 8 and 15 May 1992, were totally false.

The Committee finds that there is no evidence to support any of the allegations contained in the editions of the Weekly Mail dated 8 and 14 May 1992 and 15 to 22 May of the SAP having planned and instigated violence in the Vaal area, and that such allegations are devoid of truth.

Nothing in the evidence before the Committee justified the allegations that the SAP had a base which was linked with the planning of assassinations in the Vaal Area or the innuendo that the police were involved, with or without others, in a death campaign or in "a silent war against leaders and activists of the ANC and its allies...".

The Committee finds further that there was never any basis to justify the allegations that Capt A.D du Plessis, Constable Johannes Nkwane, Warrant Officer Thys Nolte or Sergeant George Supra were in any way involved with planning or committing acts of violence. The allegations with regard to them appear to have been based solely on the fact that they were part of the Crime Intelligence Service of the police and that, as such, they were associated with or involved in the covert operations being carried out by the CIS and that, when confronted by Mr Drew Forrest and others who investigated the matter on behalf of the Weekly Mail, they behaved secretively and were reluctant to talk or to disclose information. In the absence of other evidence, this is clearly an insufficient basis given that it was common cause that the police were indeed conducting covert operations for the gathering of intelligence for the purpose of combating crime.

| INTRODUCTION | THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE EDITION OF THE WEEKLY MAIL PUBLISHED ON 8 MAY 1992 | THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE EDITION OF THE WEEKLY MAIL PUBLISHED ON 15 MAY 1992 | OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE | THE QUESTION OF CREDIBILITY | KOLISANG'S EVIDENCE | MNGOMEZULU'S EVIDENCE | CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS | RECOMMENDATIONS |

Released: 17 November 1992

Committee: M N S Sithole (Chairman); L Baqwa; R S K Tucker

Ref: C1015

The committee was called upon to focus its inquiry on the phenomenon and incidents of public violence and alleged intimidation that occurred in the Tokoza area from three specific incidents that gave rise to considerable concern about the escalation of violence in the area, namely -

1. the assassination of 18 hostel dwellers who were on their way to a meeting of hostel dwellers at the Tokoza stadium on Sunday, 8 September 1991 ("the first incident");

2. the murder of Sam Ntuli, which occurred on 29 September 1991 ("the second incident"); and

3. the assassination of Blacks near the Natalspruit Hospital after the funeral procession for Sam Ntuli on 7 October 1991 ("the third incident").

The committee subsequently decided to inquire into a further four incidents that occurred after the commencement of its public hearings on 15 November 1991. The four further incidents were -

1. an attack on a minibus transporting employees of the Rand Water Board on the Old Vereeniging Road immediately adjacent to Phola Park on 26 February 1992 ("the fourth incident");

2. the attack on residents of the Crossroads shack settlement on 3 April 1992 ("the fifth incident");

3. the attack on the Zonkizizwe shack settlement on 6 April 1992 ("the sixth incident"); and

4. the 32 Battalion operation in Phola Park on 8 April 1992 ("the seventh incident").

Unlike other specific incidents that have been the subject of inquiry by committees of the Commission, this inquiry developed into and inquiry into the general malaise of violence in the area in question. Only in respect of the first, fourth and seventh incidents are we able to find a particular grouping responsible for the attacks, and even then neither we nor the investigating officer have been able to say with any certainty which individuals were responsible (with the exception of Ndebele in the third incident). The evidence was extensive and yet singularly unhelpful in "solving the crime". Moreover, since we found ourselves addressing the general malaise, and since we ourselves had neither the mandate nor the expert evidence nor the expertise to address such broad topics, we came to the conclusion that it would be appropriate for us to make certain broad recommendations in the hope that constitute a platform from which to proceed in addressing the general malaise of violence in this and perhaps other areas where a similar phenomenon exists.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION

A prima facie murder case exists against Ndebele and certain members of the Phola Park SDU. The said cases should be referred to the Attorney-General for a decision in this regard.

| The murder of Sam Ntuli, the chairman of the Thokoza Civic Association which occurred on 29 September 1991 | The assassination of Blacks near the Natalspruit Hospital after the funeral procession for Sam Ntuli on 7 October 1991 | An attack on a minibus transporting employees of the Rand Water Board on the Old Vereeniging Road immediately adjacent to Phola Park on 26 February 1992 | The attack on residents of the Crossroads shack settlement on 3 April 1992 | The attack on the Zonkizizwe shack settlement on 6 April 1992 | The 32 Battalion operation in Phola Park on 8 April 1992.